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pRlCil:S 
The major focus of this study is the 1965 gold reserve law. This 
la'l was b oth an economi c and poli ti cal soluti on to a number of problems 
which are discussed under the general subject of the United States balance 
of payments. I have used the 1965 law to illustrate many processes within 
the American political system. 
Chapter I serves as an introducti on to gold as it is used in the 
world monetar y system. The trend toward decreasing reserves and how the 
U.S, government becomes aware of this is ,discussed. The unsuccessful 
Multer proposal of 1961 to abolish the reserve reqUirement is examined. 
Chapter II presents the balance of payments problem from 1961 until 
1965. The economic reasons for a declining ratio of gold reserves to com­
bined liabilities of the Federal Reserve Banks is a substantial part of the 
chapter. In addition, various political aspects of the problem and the 
emergence of the actual 1 965 gold reserve proposal from the Treasury 
Department is presented. 
Chapter III explains the Bureau of the Budget's clearance process. 
Various power divisions w ithin the executive branch of American government 
are discussed as they contributed to a ccnsensus for the passage of the 
Treasury's bill. The Treasury, the Presidency, the Federal Reserve System, 
the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Department of Commerce are among 
those institutions whose influence on the bill is analyzed. 
Chapter IV reveals the story behind Congressional consideration of 
the gold reserve bill. A number of everyday p olitical occurrences, such as 
a transmittal letter from the Bureau of the Budget to Congress, were instru­
mental in advancing the b ill. In addition, the legislative proposal faced 
both House and Senate committees and was debated on the floor of the two 
chambers. Both the executive branch of the government and interest groups 
lobbied for the bill. 
Chapter V points out that the balance of payments deficit is expected 
to continue. Administration efforts to reduce the deficit have been effect­
ive. In addition, many new advisory groups and new segments of our industry 
and of our ci tizenry have grown avrare of the problem. But despite everyone's 
efforts, if the VietNam liar continues and other factors remain the same, the 
Administration may once again ask Congress to repeal the reserve require­
ment. I have no fear that thi s would be done, but I do fear that confidence 
in the dollar and confidence in American leadership might quiver in the 
process. 
Robert E. Hendrick 
718 North Third Avenue 
Maywood, Illinois 
Illinois Wesleyan Univ. Libraries 
Bloomington, Ill. 61701 
7JeJ1iLr; c,/c 
1/ 
7 
THE POLITICS OF THE 1965 GOLD RESERVE LAlrl 
/ 
Submitted for Honors Work 
in the Department of Economics 
Illinois \-Iesleyan Univ ersity 
Bloomington, Illinois 
1967 
1m1�1� Wosleyan Univ. Libraries 
J[oomington, Ill. 61701 
E. , 
bCNt".!" 
33c2.122., 
11417 
Accepted by thz Department of Economics of 
Ill i no i s  \'J e sl eyan Universi ty in ful fillment of th e 
re�l i r ement for departmental honors . 
�� &--Pr oject Jl:dvi ser ----
TABLE CF CONTENTS 
Page 
PREFACE CI • • • .. .. .. .. • • • .. .. • • • . . .. . . .. . . .. . . . · iii 
Chapter 
1. INTRODUCTION . • • • • • • • • • • 
II. THE NEED ARISES AND IS RECOGNIZED . 
III. THE BUREAU U'" THE BUDGET I S CLEAJlANCE PHOCESS 
• 0 1 
12 
• 21 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1965 GOLD RESERVE. LAI,/ 25 
V .  CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX. • • 
BIBLIOGRl!.PHY. '. . 
• 35 
39 
hI 
PREFACE 
This study grows out of my interest in economics and politics. � 
studying the politics of the 1965 gold reserve law I hope to enhance my 
understanding of hO,1 the Ameri can poB ti cal process deals with specific 
requirements of our economic system. Rather than discuss the influence of 
only one power system upon the bill 1 have attempted to concern myself 
with all the influences leading to passage of a new law. On the other 
hand, where two government departments worked f or the same goal and through 
the same inter-departmental structure, I have studied only one department 
in depth. 
My approach to the 1965 gold reserve law is to study it as a product 
of democratic concensus. Although many influences are ment ioned, most of 
the paper deals wi th selected loci of pot,er which I b el ieve to be of most 
substantial influence. 
Discus&ons of basic organizational structure and decision-making 
processes within government departments, offices, bureaus and interest 
groups are eaSily found in textbooks and pamphlets. This paper assumes 
some knowledge in these areas on the part of the reader. If the reader 
feels himself lacking, he may research the area for knowledge in some 
of my indicated sources. 
Since my vocational ambitions lie ,Iithin the subjects discussed in 
this paper, I have taken particular interest in powerful men and in the 
techniques and structures through which they express their pmfer. Thus, 
I feel justified in writing at length about specific men and the circum­
stances of their pmler, fOT I hope to be one of them some day. 
The writing of this paper pro�ded an opportunity to study every­
thing relating to gold that I could find. While I did not fully accomplish 
iii 
thi s  objecti ve, I did  read a great deal of materi al and talked wi th many 
people concerning the role of gold in the world monetary sys tem. All sources 
are not i ncluded i n  the bibli ography, but major sources from whi ch I composed 
the paper are. 
Most of the preparat i on for thi s study was completed under the 
ausp i ces of the Washington Semester program of The Ameri can University. 
Thanks are due to both I llinoi s Wesleyan Universi ty, wh i ch sent me to ou r 
nat i on' s capital, an d to The Amer i can Universi ty whi ch helped me enj oy a 
semester there. Special thanks are more than due to Professors Donald P .  
Brown and Ya_ Pik Chau of I l l i no i s  W esleyan Universi ty for inspiring me t o  
s tudy the sub ject, to N. R. Ei senstadt for maintaining my inspirat i on i n  
ori9.'l\o.\\j 
Washington for a semester, and to my father and mother for p l�ting i nspi­
(\ 
rati on Gl?iginally w ith i n  me. 
I l li noi s l'iesleyan Uni ver si ty 
Bloomington, I ll i no i s  
Apri l 1967 
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Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of gold as it relates to monetary systems is one of 
di versity. During some epochs and in some places gold has had no relation 
to money. Gold was jewelry or gold was sacred or non-existent. During 
other times and in other places gold bullion has been money. Transactions 
were barter or the y were expedited thrrugh gold as a medi um of exchange. 
Although the role of gold in various ci vi Ii zations has varied, it 
seems that a master trend over the many years of history is observable. 
\1hile the q uantity of gold whic h  exists is somewhat constant, population 
fluctuates greatly. Because each person uses money, the amount of gold 
which relates directly, as in the ca se of gold bullion used as money, or 
indirectly, as in the case of paper money backed by gold reserves, to the 
medium of exchange must fluctuate. As a natio n grows its total money 
supply grows. As the ent ire world grows at the same time in population 
and industrial activity, as is the case in recent history, modern govern­
ments attempt to reduce their required gold reserves which back their 
currenci e s. 
This chapter will discuss the fact that there simply is not enough 
gold for the United states to continue to back its money supply with as 
high a percentage of gold reserves as in the past. This chapter will also 
d! scuss some of the innumerable means by which the proll>1em of shrinking 
gold reserves is brought to the government's attention. Finally, this 
chapte r wi 11 show w hat di d happen when the problem of shri nldng gold 
reserves was brought to the government t s a ttenti on in May of 1961. 
The existing gold reserve requirement has its background in 
monetary history prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. 
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In the late 1800 ' s  several kinds of paper currency c i rculat.ed along ,l i th 
gold and silver coi n .  For the most part, all currency was freely 
conve rtible. In order to protect thi s  convertibil i ty di fferent method s 
were employed to maintain f ixed rati os between gold and currency i n  
c i rculation. The dil emma arose when the changing economy called for more 
money to circulate . The inel ast i c i ty of supply all oHed cycl i cal bouts of 
i nflati on an d  p ani c .  
Mainly to correct thi s def i ci ency, the Federal Reserve System was 
created i n  1913 . To provide a flexibl e supply of currency and to manage 
deposits  and credi t according to the best interest of the nation and 
commerce was the mandate . Converti bi l i ty into gold was maintai ned. A 
provisi on stipulating reserves for note i s sue and total l i ab il i tie s was 
de sirable to encourage the publ i cl s  confidence i n  the new i nsti tution and 
to assure acceptabil i ty of the Federal Reserve notes alongside gold whi ch 
still c i rculated abundantly .  Also, pol i ti c i ans were l imi ted i n  thei r  use 
of funds s ince credit could not be overexpanded. 
The system changed considerably in i ts first years, during \1orld 
War I ,  and during the twenti e s .  Since the economy ' s  varying needs were 
consi dered more important than mai ntenance of the reserve rati os and 
restr i ctions required by l aw, the whole content for a di s cuss on of the 
law has changed.l 
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The depres s i on of the thi rties changed economi cs both as a s cholarly 
di scipl i ne and as a word connoting a system of qu i d  pro quo real i ti e s  i n  
the emp i r i cal world.  The gold theori e s  of old may have been a major cause 
1
0ff i c i ai statement of the Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon 
before the Commi ttee on Banking and Currency, Uni ted States Senate, Feb. � 
1 965. 
of depressi ons but, at any rate, some new system of money-gold relationships 
,.as obvi ously needed. The gold law of 1934 ended the use of scarce gold as 
dome st i c  currency, and made the use of gold possible only i n  international 
accounts. The latter has not been achieved, but we are defini tely headed 
i n  that directi on. 
In the ori ginal Federal R eserve Act of 1913 reserves against dep osi� 
were set at 35% and tho se against not es at 40% . TOloiard the end of vlorld liar 
II much attention was g i ven by government and leaders of the nation to these 
reserves. I t  was fel t that the expansi on of money and credi t requi red by 
vari ous fi nancing mi £P t  exhaus t the " free gold" held i n  excess of legal 
r equi rements.  Thi5 would reduce the effectIveness of the war effort and 
bargaining posi ti on from th e standpoint of U. S. p ower . C ongress conse­
quently reduced the required r eserve percentages to 2 5% in gold against 
both not e s  and deposits of F edera l Reserve Banks. As h i stor,y turned out, 
the war soon ended and the actual rati o remained over 40% unt il 1959,2 
The p ostwar years deserve more attenti on, for the reader shou ld 
realize that 1945-194 9  i s  the peri od whose characteri st i cs beli e  the 
development of the balance of p ayments p roblem wh ich i s  so important today 
and w h i ch the 1965 gold reserve laH tried to . amel i orate. 
When di scuss ing the balance of p ayment s for a nation, tHO questi ons 
are pert inent: Hhat does the nat i on give to and what does i t  receive from 
the "IOrld economy? In the long run every nation must have a bal an ce of 
p ayments in order to effectively i ntegrate i tself into the worl d  economy. 
Thi s makes sense on paper.  But, in fact, after 110rld "Jar II  a HorId economy 
di d not exi st.  Europe Has largely i n  shambles and the so-called develop i ng 
2 
Ibi d. 
nations were not developing yet. The United States had to take on the 
responsibility of leading the world to create an international economy 
that would support considerable international trade. Through the Marshall 
plan and other forms of aid, the United states helped build an international 
system of trade. 
The pertinent question is what did the United States receive for the 
dollars it gave. The answer is gol�not economic goods and services, The 
ratio of gold reserves to combined liabilities rose significantly in the 
late forties, reflecting an increase in the stock of gold bullion. But 
what happened in the fifties and tma:.wi11 happen in the sixties when Europe 
is rebuilt and almost all nations are developing? The obvious answer is 
that when dollars go abroad they must come back. Since U. S. comparative 
productivity and interest rates are not greatly favorable to maintaining 
a balance of payments equilibrium, the dollars do come back and the gold 
goes out. Huge military and foreign aid programs also contribute to the 
difficulty of balanCing the books. It is interesting to note that our 
gold supply fell $7,216, 000,000 in the years from 1958 through 1963. 
During this same period, fifty-seven debtor nations were given over $12 
billion in foreign aid which the same fifty-seven nations used, according 
to one view, to purchase $6,977,800,000 of u. S. gold.3 The United states 
is currently exporting inflation and in the period under discussion, 
1945-1949, it was merely building up competition and then accepting the 
consequences. 
During the period from 1945 until 1959, acceptance of two new 
attitudes is discernible. First, the reserve supply of member banks in 
3
Letter from Congressman Bill Brock (R., Tenn. ) to constituents, 
Feb. , 1965, 
the Federal Reserve �stem was determined not by the volume of gold reserves 
but by federal reserve policies flexibly adapted to the current needs of the 
economy. Thi s is to say that the function of reserves as a red light to 
unsound monetary policies which adversely affect the economy took a beating. 
l4hile some sti11 think that .reserves are a necessary restraining influence, 
the mainstream of informed thought and thus those in po,mr throughout 
industry, academic circles, and government realize that the Federal Heserve 
System and the Treasury can take care of themselves without being coerced 
by impinging requirements from Congress, AmerLcan.public opinion, or other 
loci of influence.4 
The other attitude which gained a strong foothold in the postwar 
years was that gold should serv� primarily as a medium for the settlement 
of international debts. With the founding and development of such insti-
tutions as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Finance Corporati on, the Uni t.ed Nations, NATO, and many other 
economic and political organizations and procedures such as explicit and 
implicit exchange supports for times of need comes ��understanding be-
tween governments that gold should serve as an international commodity 
rather than some less valuable use. 
The second part of this chapter is a short di scussion of some of 
the means by which the problem of gold reserves is brought to the 
attention of government.S By pointing out the two changes in attitudes 
4I ntervie,1 with l�r. Harris, former Assistant Legislative Director for 
I nternati onal Affairs, now General Counsel, American Farm Bureau Federation, 
October 21, 1966. 
SSee the appendix for a list of institutions which have contact with 
the government, when they wish, to express their views on a subject such 
as gold. 
since 1945 , the heart of the matter has already been touched. I-Jhat 
influences have pushed these attitudes? 
As already noted, foreign influence upon the balance of payments 
-6-
and thus upon individual men's feelings towards maintaining a gold reserve 
is significant. Contact since the War with foreign powers has been 
immensely greater than it was before the War. Of course, this is true 
speaking in terms of financial interests, not merely in terms of political 
contacts and interests. On the industrial level, trade negotiations, 
international banl{ing meetings, and t.he growth of int.ernational corpora-
t.ions provide numerous forums through which common goals are developed. 
On the gover��ental level, the Under-Secretary of the Treasury and a 
delegation of Treasury and Federal Reserve personnel meet with the French 
government and other powerful European governments every three weeks or so. 
These meetings are indicative of the many channels of communication now 
available. 
Within the United States a very large number of groups advise each 
other as to the balance of payments. These groups exist both in and out 
of government and are both formal and informal. The Quadriad--the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, the 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Director of the 
Bureau of the Bud�et--, the Business Leadership Advisory Council on the 
Balance of Payments, a group of powerful corporation heads, and the 
American Bankers Association are good examples of the prestigious groups 
which dominate the discussion. Each of these power centers is responsive 
to a number of divergent interests. Also, it may be noted that a great 
deal of personnel change takes place within these groups. A former 
�\\.I'\ 
Secretary of the Treasury \.,ould more likely be a partner in a Viall Street 
1\ 
i nvestment f i rm and a member of a few advi sory groups to i ndustry and 
government . 
Thi s di scussi on concentrat ed on the balance of payment s, but i t  
should be  not ed t hat communi cati on flO1,lS on relat ed sub jects throughout 
the entire l,forld and parti cularly here in the United States . The press 
helped keep t he pub l i c  in for med and aided wi despread acceptance of the 
two att itudes di scussed above. 
In other chapters the 1 965 gold reserve law wi ll be understood 
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as the final outcome of a struggle for democrat i c  consensus. The theory 
of the Amer i can poli t ical process st at e s  that major bi 1 1 s  are the product 
of count less divergent power stru cture s ,  pressures,  opinions, and act ions .  
I n  fa ct, thi s  i s  the case for the success of the 1965 gold reserve l aw and 
the fa i lure of the 1 961 M ulter b i l l. 
H seems appropriat e to present briefly the peri od from 1959 unt i l  
M ay o f  196 1 .  What ci rcumstances developed which caused Representat i ve 
M ulter t o  i ntroduce h i s  b i l l  on M ay 9, 1961 ,  which atte�pted to remove 
reserve requi rement s? 
As early as 1 957 the rat i o  of reserves t o  total l i abi l it i es began 
t o  decline gradually, principally as a result of a marked decrease i n  
the gold stock along with a gradual increase i n  Federal Reser ve note 
l i abi lities.  Although bank cr edit and bank deposits  increased, expansi on 
i n  member bank reSerVe b a!ffilCeS at the Reserve Banks was held down by 
oc casi onal decreases i n  member bank reserve requ i r ement s. Th i s  ,las, of 
cour se, pos sible through monetary management and the prerogat i ves of the 
Federal Reserve Board. 
Starti ng in 1960, Federal Reserve bank note and deposit l i abilities  
expanded more rapi dly. The wi  thdra,lal of  si lver cert ifi cat e s  and thei r  
replacement by Federal Reserve notes is one reason for the increase. As 
a result of the above and other developments, the reserve requirements 
of the Federal Reserve Banks increased to 16.6 billion dollars by May of 
1961. The gold stock was dmm tolP14.3 billion, leaving free gold of 
only about $2.3 billion. 
Beginning in the third quarter of 1960 more and more gold had been 
purchased from the U. S. Treasury. The London gold market, a normal 
place to buy gold, was underpri ced by the Treasury! s .$35 per ounce stand-
ing offer. The London market price moved from a monthly average of $35.09 
in June to $35.22 in September. The price flared up until it hit a peak 
of $40 per ounce on October 20, after which it settled down. Central Bank 
buying in London ceased altogether as the price rose, though the Bank 
usually buys and sells to maintain a stable price at the pegged level. 
The Federal Reserve's shift to a restrictive credit policy, 
supplemented b y  the Admini strati on • s successful efforts to rebalance the 
budS)et, helped check the gold outfloH during 1959 despi te the persistent 
large payments deficit. The accelerated gold loss during the second half 
of the year--notwithstanding a remarkable improvement in the merchandise 
trade balance--appears to hawe been aggravated by apprehensions that a 
new administration taking office this month might use inflationary fi­
nance to spur economi c a cLi vi ty and grOloJth.6 
The reader should also realize that United States relations with 
the International Monetary Fund affected the level of gold stocks. In 
June of 1959, $344 million was transferred to the Fund in payment of the 
6u. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, Hearings 
�on�S�.�7�9�7, 89th Congress, 1st Sess., 1965, pp. 4�6. 
gold portion of the pledged subscription. Additional sums moved from the 
U.S. to foreign �ovemments which also had to pay their pledged subscrip­
tions in gold or had to repay in gold, as required by the Fund statutes, 
part of their currency drawings. France was one of a number of nations 
in thi s posi tion. 
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Upon taking office, the Kennedy Administration realized that the 
gold stock was down to nearly 17 bi lli on dollar s. It also reali zed that 
the monthly rate of loss was becoming dangerously high. The Administration 
knew that on e way of coping with the problem ,Jas to put it off until a 
later date by seeking the abolition of the reserve requirements. Thus, the 
1965 gold reserve law, which finally emerged, had been tossed arcund by 
informed government and industry le aders since as early as 1951. 
Two men of high position that advocated the repeal of the cover were 
H. Rueff of France and Dr. Burns of the United States. H. Jaques Rueff, 
one of the architects of French financial restoration after World War II, 
voiced strong opposition to the reserve requirements of the United States. 
Rueff felt that the central banks of the ,JQrld should cash in the! r dollars 
for gold as a preliminary step to the restoration of ,the gold standard 
which would be brought about by a series of international agreements at 
conferences on gold and money. To make possible the large-scale cashing 
in of dollars, Rueff recommended the repeal of the cover requirement in 
the Uni ted states. 
Dr. Arthur Burns, the fotmer top economic adviser in the Eisenhower 
Administration and in 1961 the president of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, stated publicly that the reserve requirement should be repealed 
because more free gold wi 11 be needed to protect the U.S. role as the lead­
ing international banker and also to protect the dollar against speculators.7 
7
Yhe New York Tim,s, August 8, 1963, p. 1h. 
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The above paragraphs present quite a thorough background to the 
Nulter proposal. On Nay 9, 1961 Representative /llulter introduced a bill 
with two s ections. One of them is  not relevant to this study, but the 
other proposed to eliminate the nation's gold reserve requirements. 
Hearings were scheduled, then vl€re indefini tely pos tponed. \iha t happened? 
In 1 965 the democratic ccnsensus which is  needed to pass major legis­
lation in the Congress was present to bolster action on the gold reserve 
law. In 1961 democratic con sensus was not present. The Administration 
backed the bill, thinking that domestic power structures would back it also. 
The only fear was that foreign governments would feel thatthe United states 
was solvin g  its balance of payments problem in a backhand way. This might 
start a further run on the nation's gold supply. 
What actually happened was far different from l-lhat the Administration 
had proposed. Reaction from abroad was favorable, as  exemplified in N. Rueff's 
thinking. But here at home the story was drastica ly different. Thousands 
of people--farmers, small businessmen, housewives, other citizens--expressed 
their adverse sentiments toward the idea of changing the relationship bet\.Ieen 
gold and the dollar in any vlay. Thus, many Congressmen called the Treasury 
and Federal Reserve to let them know of their opposition. This spontaneous, 
grass roots type of opposition to a major bill does impress the Fed and 
Treasury in addition to aw�ening other power structures within the govern­
ment like the Executive Offices of the President. 
The Administrati�n was quite surprised by the reaction against the 
bill on the domestic front. Besides the many citizens who made their 
views known, a large number of powerful individuals called directly to the' 
Treasury or Fed from arou nd the nation. Bernard Baruch exemplifies the 
opposition. He called the Fed to state emphatically that this Has not the 
- 1 1-
time to ask for repeal of the reserve requirement. Confidence in the dol-
lar might be weakened at a time when we could ill afford it. 
After consultation among the top positions of the Fed, Treasury, 
Bureau of the Budget, and other Executive Offices of the President, t.he 
Admini st.ration asked Hulter to stop his effort. 8 He did and t.hus the 
proposal was indefinitely postponed. Just how long this approach to solv-
ing the balance of payments problem remained dormant is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
8Interview with Guy E.  Noyes, Senior Vice-President and Economist, 
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. , November 2), 1966, 
Chapter II 
THE NEED ARISES AND IS RECOGNIZED 
,During 1961 the Administration proclaimed that the deficit arising 
out of the balance of payments w�s to be viewed as a problem in itself. 
Culminating in the defeated Multer proposal, the Administration made clear 
its opposition to the further weakening of its balance of payments position. 
The consequent attention paid to the problem by foreign sources and American 
government and industry resulted in a brief period of surplus. 
However, the storm struck again and grew in breadth. So much gold 
was lost in the next four years that one mi ght gi ve up trying to explain 
the loss rationally. For four years the government constantly attempted 
to solve the problem. But the gold continued to flow abroad in greater 
amounts. If Russia had been able to plant its agents in key positions in 
the United states government hr! th instructions to carry out Lenin's plan 
for destruction of a "capi tali stic" economy a more thorough job of "gutting" 
the economy by extracting its basic gold reserves could not have been 
accompli shed. 
vlhat happened during the years and .ihat at tempts were made to solve 
the problem? In the second quarter of 1961 the U.S. lost gold. In the 
third quarter the deficit increased to a rate of more than $3 billion per 
year. By the end of 1961 the ratio of gold certificate reserves to deposit 
and note liabilities combined was 34.8. It was 37.4 at the end of 1960.9 
!�any groups reacted to this highly dangerous situation. The Commission 
on 110ney and Credit, composed of influential government and industry leaders, 
90fficial statement of the Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon 
before the Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate, Feb. 2, 1965. 
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recommended repeal of the entire reserve requirement. I n  the meetings of 
the Business COUDci 1 the idea Has tossed around. Thi s Council is a group 
of top industrialists including such pOHerful men as David Rockefeller, 
President of the Chase 14anhaUan Bank. Many other advisory groups such as 
the National Advisory Council, Hhich Has set up in 1944 under the Bretton 
Woods Conference, began to discuss the idea within government sponsored 
forums. Even interest groups as far removed from the purely monetary problem 
like the American Farm Bureau Federation included in their annual list of 
resolutions a strong statement warning the government of the consequences 
of alloHing the deficit to groH.10 
I n  1962 the ratio of reserVes to total liabilities dropped from 
34.8 to 31.8. By this time foreign central bankers and governments Here 
beginning to pay close attention to our problem. President Kennedy and 
top level administrators in the Fed and Treasury stated emphaticall�hat 
the dollar Hould be defended and that the United states Hould not change 
the Horid price of gold. In  i-rs effort to halt the gold losses the 
Administration emphasized the debt repa.yment m,ed from \,orld l,ar I I  by 
foreign governments. 
; 
The Treasury issued a seri es of communi ques to 
governments of nations in strong financial positions hinting that it 
Hould appreciate advance payments on their debts. The United states also 
informed the entire ,1Orld that "the only Ha.y to stop gold losses is to 
eliminate the deficits in the U.S. balance of payments and the corresponding 
surpluses in the payments positions of countries such as Prance,11 Thus, 
lOAmerican Parm Bureau Pederation, Parm Policies for 1961, Resolutions 
on National Issues Adopted at the 47th Annual Meeting, Chicago, Dec. 1961, 
P9 320 
I1public letter from U.S. Treasury Department to those interested in 
gold losses and debt repayment of foreign nations, 1962. 
the government countered DeGaulle' s resentment that the U.S. had been able 
to run a deficit. In the stru9gle for world financial influence, the 
importance of psychology is paramount. The Treasury Department made a 
spec! al effoTt to convince other nations to respond to the Uni ted States 
problem f avorably. Chapter four will discuss at some length the dominance 
of psychology in thinking about gold reserves and therein the balance of 
payments. 
-lu-
vlhat happened in 1963? The situation worsened and the ratio of 
reserves to total liabilities fell from 31.8 to 29.7. The United States lost 
$415 million in gold. However, many indications \,ere present to show that 
the problem would finally be faced head-on and some type of solution would 
emerge. 
On July 18th President Kennedy singled out the deficit for attention 
in. a major speech. From this time on, the balance of payments became the 
concern of almost everyone. Daily newspapers, weekly magazines, journals, 
and a great number of investor's publications highlighted the deficit and 
discussed current developments relating to it. 
Exports versus imports, foreign investment, tourism, and United States 
mt 1i tary expendi tures and fore! gn ai d all became subjects of controversy. 
It is clear from an examination of the Congressional Record for 1963 that 
new dimensions were added to the discussion of old interests. The point is 
that a new poli tical aspect was given to problems of exporting, importing, 
and investing that had not been present before. 
On February 10, 1965, during the period that Congress Has approving 
the 1965 gold reserve law, President Johnson proposed in his annual Balance 
of Payments message a net. aura of cooperati on between government and 
industry. Thi s proposal has been follm,ed up as wi 11 be di scussed in 
Chapter five. TI1e foundation of cooperation was laid in 1962 and 1963. 
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One indication of this ;JaS the Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary 
Affairs advocating a merging of government and industry efforts in front of 
the American Bankers Association. He said, " • • • • •  for the banking fraterni ty 
has played, and >Ji11 certainly co ntinue to play, a leading part in alertin g 
Am£rica to its Balance of Payments problems and the new efforts needed to 
1 i mi t. costs and rai se product i vi ty ! n order to promote both greater gro,lth 
and more exports. Bankers know that the dimensions of the problem ahead 
are sti 11 1arge."12 
TOHard the later sessions of Congress in 1963, the gold reserve 
requirement was discussed at length. Senator Javits suggested hearings to 
Senator Douglas, the Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee. Theae hear­
ings provided a forum for discussion and stirred considerable interest.13 
By late 1963, the gold situation was deplorable. The amount of gold 
stock in excess of the required monetary reserves was exceeded by net for-
ei gn short-term claims of more than 17 bi IIi on dollars. The future solvency 
of the United states clearly depended on the forbearance of its foreign 
short-term creditors. 
1964 brought >lith it no relief for the balance of payments problem. 
The retia of gold certificates to total liabilities dropped from 29.7 to 27.5. 
LaH required 25% reserves and the situation was fast becoming a crisis. 
12Robert V. Roosa, "Banking and the Balance of Payments", Economic Gro,lth­
Balance of Payments, discussions by three men at the 88th annual convention of 
the American Bankers Association (Atlantic City, New Jersey, Sept; 25-28, 1962), 
p. 2. 
13u.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearings Concatning 
the World Monetary System, 88th Congress, 1st Sess., 1963. 
Gold and 
Al though the exi sting Federal Reserve Lav! conta! ned emergency provi si ons 
allowing the government to revoke the r eserve requirement temporarily, the 
Treasury reco�nized that this would not be in the best interest of the na­
tion. The dollar l-lQuld have to be defended by Dther means. 
The nature of the 2.2 percentage decline in reserves merits further 
consideration. The loss of gold was $125 million, 36 million dollars to 
foreigners and 89 million dollars to industrial and artistic users 1>iithin 
the United States. The crucial observation is that the domestic money sup­
ply expanded greatly to meet the growing needs of rising business activity. 
Along with replacement of silver certificates by Feder'al Reserve notes, it 
became clear tha t  the 25% reserve requirement would soon become a burden to 
effecti ve monetary management of the economy .14 
vlhen a problem becomes acute as the gold loss by 1965, dl scussi on 
becomes extensive in high government circle? \-lithin the Cabinet a bal­
ance of payments committee was formed to suggest various means to improve 
the wor sening sl tuati on. The Troika and associated students of the problem 
also discussed it. The Troika consists of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Chairman o f  the Council of E�nomic Advisers, and the Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve System. These men and often times their delegations meet 
once a week or so to discuss important matters relating to the economy. 
The President also lunches l1ith this group before major decisions are made 
as was the case in this instance. Throughout the Secretarial Offices of 
the Treasury and important Executive Offices of the President, the gold 
reserve lal1 was made into a subject of prime importance. 
Before presentin9 the specific emergency of the proposal to elimi­
nate reserves for deposits I1hich came from the Treasury Department, a 
l40fficial statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, op. cit. 
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brief discussion of the orpanization of power within the Treasury is 
appropriate. 
The Secretary of the Treasury, a Presidential appointee, is a member 
of the Cabinet and responsible for the entire Treasury Department. He is 
the l eader in policy making within the department. Since the balance of 
payments is primarily a Treasury function and responsibility, the Treasury 
Secretary and his top assistants were the men within the government to 
in! t!ate acti on. 
When a ctual choices must be made, the Secretary himself rarely de-
cides the issue without consultation. The bulk of major decisions on 
financial matters arise from a democratic consensus among the eight Under-
Secretari es and Assis tant Secretari es. Thi s, in bri ef, is the power struc-
ture wi thin the Treasury. Staff men are used and valuable and mar;y di v! sions 
, 
exist, the heads of which have considerable pm,rer in their fields of respon-
sibility and specialty. But the power to choose among diverse alternatives 
lies at the top and wi thin the various secretaryships!5 
How were the powers of choice exercised in the case of the 1965 gold 
reserve proposal which b ecame law? As previously implied, each of the 
secretaries involved in the decision has innumerable contacts outside the 
Treasury. For example, the head Secretary is th e Chairman of the Advisory 
Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems, as previously 
mentioned. The Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs, the office directly 
accountable for the 1965 gold reserve law, often meets with industrial 
groups to inform them o f  nevI deve1 opments. 
More speCifically, what happened to bring about the Treasury pro-
posal formally announced on January 28, 1965? More than half of the 1964 
15The Uni ted States Treasury, Treasury Department, 1966. 
gold l oss oc curred i n  the las t  quarter. Whi le discussion had been go i ng 
on for some t i me throughout the var i ous s ecretarial offi ces , the problew 
was now urgent. The men i nvolved were C. Douglas D i l lon, Secretary of the 
Tr easury , Henry H. Fowler , Di 11 on ' s  r eplacement ,rho formally took off! ce 
January 1 (although Di llon s tayed around for more than a month aftenmrd ) , 
Robert V .  R oosa, Under-Secretary for l<1 onetary Affair s ,  Paul V olcker,  Deputy 
Under-Secretary for None tary Affa i rs ,  Leland Howard, Di rector of the Offi ce 
of Domestic Gold and Si lver Ope rations ,  and possibly someone else represent­
i ng other Treasury offi ces . These men regular ly meet every few weeks to 
di scuss pending leg i s la tion and to i ni tiate pr oposals . I t  was within this 
group that the i dea was accepted to eliminate gold backing for deposi ts but 
to retain i t  for notes. Secretary Di llon wanted to repeal both r equi rements 
from an economi c atandpoi nt, as did  everyone else,  but poli tical cons i dera­
tions won out. The mai n  objective of the Treasury ' s  proposal would be to 
present somethi ng palatable to Congress, for e i gn influences , and the American 
publi c. At the same t i me ,  the Treasury Secreta ries realized the cr isis na­
ture of the p roposal and wanted to make sure that something wou ld be done to 
achi eve a better pos i t i on for the do l lar. 
What the Administration di d wi th gold and the dol lar wou ld be keenly 
noti ced i n  i nternati onal financi al ci rcles. France had put a great deal of 
pressur e on us in January . DeGualle 1 s government announced January 8th that 
i t  would convert j�150 mi l l i on dol lars to gold. In al l of 1964, the United 
States had lost only $6 m i ll i on to forei gn sources and only about 1)18 
mi l l i on to Fran ce.  The announcement caused a flurry of speculative activity 
in international money mar ke t s .  Humor s cir culated that the Uni ted States 
mi ght even devalue the dollar. The United States government had i t s  back 
to the wall and was forced to act . 
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The group of Secretar i es deci ded to act. Roosa f e lt that both 
requir ements should be reduced to abou t 10%. Volcker thought that repeal 
of only the depos i ts requirement wou ld be suffi c i ent .  From a traditi ona l 
standpoint the requir ement for d epos i t s  was less importa.'1. t than that for 
notes. The Ame r i can publ i c  wou ld not oppos e a change involving what the i r  
local banke rs did with depos i ts and thus what the Fed d i d  concernin g i ts 
deposi ts .  However, Ame r i cans would not i ce a change i n  the rela t i on between 
gold and the currency of e veryday us e .  Dr. Howard agreed that elimination 
of only one requi rement woo ld be acceptable to the publi c  and to Congress, 
but s till be suffi c i ent to defend the dollar.  
After a few ini tia l contacts from the Treasury to the Bureau of  the 
Budget, the coors e  of a ct i on was dec i ded upon. D i llon made a few ca l ls on 
var i ous men wi thin the P res i dent ' s  Executive Offi ce, including the Budget 
Director and the Cha irma n  of the Counci l  of Economi c Advisers • .  After 
receiving thei r  approval and the final okay from his Secretaries , Di l lon 
ordered the bi ll to be drafted by his G eneral Counsel.  
On December 23, 1964, the Treasury's G eneral Counsel G .  d ' Andelot 
wrote a two page letter to the Offi ce of Legislati ve R eference wi thin the 
Bureau of the Budget. The letter outlined the proposed change in law, 
g i ving background and reasons why the Tre�sury felt a change was neces­
sary. The � ter asked for ini tial reacti on from all quarters . Since 
the next chapter w i l l  discuss the clearing process in some detai l ,  i t  
s eems suffi ci ent to say that approva l was r eceived. 
During January Pres i dent Johnson 's annual economi c message was 
being prepared. A number of the Pres i dent's s taff men and a number of men 
from vari oos Executive Offi ces work together to prepare the message .  Al­
though the Treasury or i gi nally gave Dr. Howard the opportuni ty to announce 
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the pendi ng legis lation i n  a speech to his c l i ente le,  the Bureau of the Budget 
whi ch coordinates efforts of vari ous departments, executive offi ces , and 
Pres i dential staff, decided that the Pres i dent wou ld announce the move on 
January 28.  Francis M. Bator , Deputy Special Assis tant to the Pres i dent 
for Nati onal Securi ty Affairs , was ins trumental in guarding the prerogati ves 
of the Presi dent i al Offic e .  Si nce th e Treas ury reali zed i t  mi ght. need the 
Pres i dent 's expl i c i t  support t o  pass the b i ll, it. was content to let the 
Pres i dent announce the measur e . 16 
Thus i t  was that on January 2 8 ,  1965, Pres i dent. J ohnson said, "I  am 
reques ti ng the Congress, therefore,  to eliminate the arbi trary requi rement 
that the Federal R eserve Banks maintain a gold certifi cate reserve agains t  
their depos i t  l i ab i l i t i es ." 
16Interview w i th Leland Howard, Director of the Office of Domes t i c  Gold 
and Si lver Operations, U . S .  Treasury Department, October 19, 1966. 
Chapter III 
THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET ' S CLEARANCE PROCESS 
When a problem arises and when that problem is  recogni zed, acti on 
takes place. The Treasury Department is responsible for suggest ing poli­
c i es to mai ntai n  a reasonable equ i l i br i um in the balance of payments . 
True t o  t he above guideli nes, the Treasury was the department i n  whi ch 
the 1965 gold reserve law originat ed.  
Because areas of responsibi l ity and consequent powers overlap from 
one department t o  another, and becaus e  a problem l ike the balance of pay­
ments has repercussi ons whi ch di rectly i nvolve the act i vit i es of a number 
of departments , the Bureau of the Budget attempts to coordinat e  legisla­
t i ve aims of the execut i ve branch of Ame r i can government . 
This chapter wi ll discuss the act i ons of the Bureau of the Budget 
wi th regard to the 1965 gold reserve law. t4hU e  thi s bi 11 did not run 
into much oppos it i on,  it does s erve to indi cate a number of processes 
wi thin the Bureau. Other formal power centers wi thin government wi ll be 
discussed bri efly i��UCh as the i r  part i cipat i on i n  the law making process 
was upon request from the Bureau of the Budget . 
Upon recei ving the December 23rd letter from the General Counsel of 
the Treasury, Robert \Ciallace, the head of the Di  vi s ian of Leg; s lati ve 
R eference, had one t ask. That was to dis cover whether this proposal was 
within the s cope of the Pres i dent ' s  legislat i ve program. Primari ly through 
us e of the phone, lfa llace and his staff ascertained that the Pres i dent and 
hi s Execut i ve Offi ceswould like to see the b i l l  i ntroduced. 11r. Bator of 
the Vlhi te House Staff, Di rector Gordon of the Bureau of the Budget , and 
R alph Young, Advi ser t o  the Boal-d of GovernoIS of the Federal R eserve 
Syst em were among those cal l ed. 
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Af ter the approva l  of the Pres i dent through the Bureau of the 
Budget and the decis i on to let the Pres i dent announce the proposal publi cly 
on January 28th, the Treasury draf ted four letters . As a rule, the s ta ndard 
procedure f or execut i ve ;ni tiated b i ll s  is f or one depa rtment to prepar e  a 
draf t of the bill  and two letters of transmi tta l g i vin g the jus tif i ca ti on 
for the proposal . The se letters a re given to the Pres i dent of the Senate and 
Speake r of the House . The bill  and accompany i ng le tter rece ive two checks 
before t ransmi tta l ,  one in the depa rtment i n  which they ori gi nate and the 
other i n  the Bureau of the Budge t . 17 
R oy T.  Englert, the Deputy G ene ra l  Counsel of the Treasury Department, 
draf ted the legislat i on and le tters of transmitta l .  I n  additi on to the two 
letters to the pre s i di ng offi cers of the two chambers of Congress,  letters 
were wri tten di rectly to R epresentative Patman, Cha i rman of the Hous e  Bank-
lng and Currency Commi tte e ,  and Sena tor R obertson, Cha i rman of the Senate 
Banki ng and Currency Co�m i tte e .  This extra le tte r  writing probably should 
be vi ewed as pressure f rom the Trea sury and Bureau of the Budget to make 
sure the b i l l  would be referred to the des ired commi ttee. Patman had publi cly 
recognized the need f or s ome a ction to ease our balance of payments problem 
f or some time .  Privately , he ma i ntains good contact with the Treasury and 
Federa l Reserve Board, more wi th the f ormer than w i th the latte r .  Both 
Robertson and Patman had been con tacted through the Congress i ona l lia ison 
offi ce of the Treasury to let them know of the proposa l. 
Before the four letters left the Treasury , they were gone over by a 
group consi sting of the G enera l  Counsel,  the Secreta ry of the Treasury , the 
Under-Secretary of the Treasury for Mone tary Affai rs ,  the Director of the 
17Interview w i th Jefferson Burri s ,  Legislati ve Attorney , Legislative 
R efe rence,  The Bureau of the Budget, December 1 ,  1966. 
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Office of Domest i c  Gold and Si lver Operat i ons, and other i nt erested part i es .  
In other words ,  the same men previ ous ly ment i oned, who were respons ible for 
init i ating the propos al, kept t rack of its progress. Agai n, i n  the Bureau 
of the Budget, the General Counsel al ong .lith representat ives of the Di vi­
s i ons of Budget R evi e\, and Legislat i ve Clearance, go over the letters. lS 
Before  the D i vis i on of Legis lat i ve Clearance finally approves the 
legislat i on it must perform a series of checks w it h  all interested depart­
ments and agenci es . J efferson Burris , a legislative attorney within the 
di vis i on, and others w rote letters or called all those people that they 
thought mi ght w ant t o  comment on the b i l l .  'Each power cent er that w as con­
tacted w i l l  be bri efly discussed. 
The reader should keep i n  mind that the communi cati on under cons i der­
at ion here w as i n  many cases a formal follow-up to an e arl ier informal check. 
Such w as the case w ith the Counci l of E conomi c Advisers .  Gardiner Ackeley, 
the Chai rman, approved the measure . He, of course,  had previously known of 
it through his part i cipat ion i n  the Troika and other groups . 
The Department o f  State approved the proposal,  but st at ed that it 
w ould l ike to s ee both reserve requ i rements repealed. This would free more 
gold for purpos es of i nternat ional transacti ons . 
The Department of Commerce approved the measure. The structure of 
this department is akin to that of the Treasury and the pow er to make 
decl s i ons is simi  lar ly vested. For thi s reason, the ro le tie Commerce 
Department played i n  the passing of this bi l l  is not dis cussed in this 
paper. The importance of maintainin9 confidence i n  the dollar so that our 
exports mi ght be i ncreased is obvi ous . Through the Genera l Counse l  and 
w ith t he approval of John T. Connor, the Secret ary of Commerce, approval 
was formally gi ven. Secretary Connor has more than thirty advisory groups 
whi ch advis e him, including a ni ne man i ndustrial committee on the balance 
of payment s .  I f  any one o f  these groups had obj ected t o  the bi l l ,  its 
voi c e  would have been recorded. Ther e was no such objecti on, l 9  
The federal Reserve System and Chairman l1 i l l i am M .  Mart i n  were 
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strong backers of the b i l l  from the beginn i ng .  In �act, i t  appears that 
the deci s i on to t ry to repeal one part of the requi rement whi le retaining 
the other part may wel l  have been a pri vate agreement between Di llon and 
!4art i n, init i ated by the latter. 
Constant strong backing from the Pres i dency helps pass legis latIon. 
Lawrence O'Bri en and J os eph Cali fano, J r . , two pres i dent i al ass istants 
who overse e the Chief Execut i ve's legis lat i ve program, Cali fano being as-
s i gned t o  all economi c matters ,  maintai n  close contact with Congress . 
Through a w i de vari ety of means , but especi ally through phone calls, the 
Pres i dency ai ded the gold reserve b i l l . 20 
Along ,I i th the leadershi p of t he Pres! dency and the Treasury 
Department , the Bureau of the Budget records show an overwhelming democrat i c  
consensus approving the bi l l  within the execut i ve branch of the government . 
1 9Int erview with J ohn T.  Connor, Secret ary of the Department of Commerce, 
November 30, 1966. 
20Interv i ew with Larry Levinson, ass istant t o  Joseph Cal i fano, J r" 
Dir ector of the Pres i dent 's legisl at i ve program, November 11,  1966. 
Chapter IV 
CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF THE 1965 GOLD RESERVE LAW 
,Ihen the executive branch strongly r ecommends l e g i s lation, Congress 
usual ly reacts wi th such vi gor that qui te a lengthy study could be wri tten 
describing the i nterests at work . Thi s chapter w i l l  attempt to condense 
Congressi c;nal reacti on to the 1965 gold reserve proposal to a mi nimum. In 
discussing testimony for the Commi ttee on Banking and Currency, the role 
of i nterest groups and other i nsti tutions ,Ji ll be examined. 
On January 2 8 ,  1965, the same day that the Presi dent had recommended 
the legi slation, Speaker l'lcCormack recei ved a letter from Secretary D i l lon 
of the Treasury advocati ng a change i n  the exi sting law. A copy of recom­
mended changes in the law was accompani ed by a transmi ttal letter whi ch gave 
background relating to gold, the economy, and accepted econom i c  theory. Also 
on January 28th, Representative Patman, Chai rman of the Commi ttee on Banki ng 
and Cur rency, formally introduced the b i l l  in front of the Hous e.  
The bi l l  was referred t o  Patman ' s  committee without objecti on. Hear­
ings were scheduled for February 1st, at the request of Representati ve Patman. 
In commi ttee s i tuati ons, oftentimes chai rmen are barons , especi ally i f  they 
have great expertise  and seni ori ty in the i r  f i eld of specialty. Such i s  the 
case w i th ,Iri ght Patman . Thus, i t  i s  noteworthy to observe what hi s vie,;s 
were on the subject for thi s i s  a c lue to what was done i n  committee. 
I t  wi ll be not i ced that Patman ' s  approach to the subj ect i s  similar 
to that whi ch the Admin i strat i on had and to that of most other i ndiv i duals 
di s cussed in thi s  study. In introducing the hearing, Patman stated two 
bas i c  reasons why the gold cover should be reduced. First, the money supply 
mus t increase as the economy g rows in order to avo i d  e conomic s trangulati on. 
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Second, the gover!U11ent must provi de i t self wi th flexibil  i ty whi ch i s  needed 
to maintain the i nternati onal value of the dol lar and the consequent sta­
bi l i ty of the entire world monetary mechani sm. 
Patman went on to concur wi th the v i ew present ed by others that there 
i s  no good econom i c  reason for maintaining any reserves .  " The entire re­
qui r ement i s  the vesti g i al remains of a dead system. "  The needs of an 
economi c system change as conditions change. However, ther e are \Q1i d  
psychologi cal reasons for retai n i ng some reserves and i f  further action i s  
necessary, Congress wi 1 1  respond at the appropri ate ti me. 
Like all i ntelli gent chai rmen, Patman attempted to use the forum to 
advance one of hi s pet i nterests. Whi le v i ewing the current gold problem 
as an outgrowth of the balance of payments problem, Patman suggested that 
the commi ttee i nqui re into what he felt to be a substanti a l  cause of the 
problem. The U . S .  banks make huge loans to fore i gn f i nancial entities.  
Although the interest equali zati on tax helps, perhaps further restri ctions 
should be placed on these loan s .  
Secretary Di llon o f  the Treasury was the first witness. Since the 
Treasury has been one of the major focuses of thi s paper, i t  i s  appropriate 
to backtrack to show how hi s testimony reflects a democrati c consensus 
with i n  the Treasury Department . 
How i s  Congressi onal testimony prepared wi thi n  a department? In 
thi s case, Paul Volcker, the D eputy Under-Secretary of the Treasury for 
110netary Aflai r s ,  drafted the speech for Secretary Di  l lon. Volcker wrote 
from h i s  general knowledge of the subject plus that wh i ch he gained by 
reading the exi sti ng Federal Reserve lal, and such materials.  He n oti ced 
that an hi stori cal precedent exi sted for divi s i on of the reserve requi rement 
i nto two parts, one for not es and one for deposits .  Thus , D i l lon ' s  tes t i mony 
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emphasized the d i vi s i on of the requi rement by requesting repeal of only the 
cover for deposi t s .  
The testimony was reviewed by a l l  the heads of interested offices 
wi thin the Treasury. Roosa, Howard, Di l lon, and Englert approved the testi -
mony . All executive  branch testimony must be r evi ewed by the Bureau of the 
Budget before it i s  presented to Congress.  Oftentimes, e specially i f  the 
Bureau already has cleared the legi slation, thi s review i s  completei superfi -
c i a11y. Thu s ,  the Treasury submi tted D i l l on ' s  testimony one day before i t  
was gi ven to Congress . The Bureau of th e 'Budget approved i t  wi  tMn hours . 2 1  
To di gress a b i t  further, i t  i s  interesting t o  note that the Treasury 
and the Bur eau of the Budget sent out a number of cop i e s  of Di l lon ' s  
testimony to government offices and to industry . The first Nati onal City 
Banl{ i n  l1e,[ York regularly recel ves a copy of major speeches gi  ven by top-
level Secretar i e s .  All thi s  indicates that communi cation does exi s t  on 
important problems throughout the fi nanci al power structure of the United 
States.  
Secretary D i l lon, i n  hi s testimony before the Commi ttee on Banki ng 
and Currency, stated that the r equirement should be repealed for exactly 
the reasons that Patman had stated. Concerning the balance of payments ,  
D i l lon said that the change i n  law wauld g i ve the United States  government 
and industry t i me to s olve the problem. He r eferred to the upcoming 
february 10th balance of payments message to Congress by .the Presi dent . 
In genera l ,  the commi ttee member s  seemed to feel that the repeal 
of the c over for deposits wou l d  be acceptable to them .  However, a majori ty 
of them i mpl i ed that they would accept r epeal of both requi rements i f  the 
2 lrnterview wi th Paul Volcke r, Vice-Presi dent , Chase Manhattan Bank, 
November 23,  1966. 
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admini stration so requested. The advi sab i l i ty of thi s  move was discussed 
at l ength, centering on the question of psychology. Di l l on rei terated a 
number of t i me s  that psychologi cal con s i derations had been present since 
1 913 in the or i gi na l  federal Reserve Act .  " There has always been a psy-
chologi ca1 feel ing i n  the part of many that a gold reserve against notes 
was very i mportant."  The Un! ted States should not do anything to endanger 
the confi dence of certain sma l l  banker s ,  some busi nessmen, and a whole host 
of others who expressed di sfavor with the 1961 !lIul ter proposal as previ ously 
consi dered in th i s  paper. 
vJi I I i  am HcChesney HarH n, Jr . ,  Chai rman of the Board of Governors of 
the fed was the next wi tness.  H i s  statements coinc i ded c losely wi th D i l lon ' s  
remarks . Hartin s tressed the changing role of gold in our monetary system 
and sai d that he fel t  the suggested approach of reducing the r eserves only 
on depos i t s  would be acceptable to the Ameri can publi c  and also be a prag-
mati c  solution to the balance of p ayments defi ci t .  Upon being que sti oned, 
,'1artin di scussed the psychologi cal problem of maintai ning confidence i n  
much the same ,JaY tha t Di l Ion had . A couple of commi ttee members advocated 
a 15% l i nkage of rold to deposi ts and notes .  The Chairman o f  the Board of 
Governors granted them that a case mi ght be made e i ther way, but hi s profes-
s ional judgment leaned toward retaining 25% cover on note s .  Martin sai d 
that he had given much thought t o  the questi on over a per i od of years . The 
conclus i on of h i s  thinking seemed to be that the Un; ted States should follmr 
the tradi ti onal approach. Since a di stincti on was made between deposi ts and 
notes from the begi nning, i t  should be kept that way. 
No more wi tnesses were heard. The commi ttee entered executive sessi on 
and marked up H . R .  3818 whi ch soon Has to become a ne,r laH.22 The vote for 
22 U . S .  Congress, House, Commi ttee on Banking and Currency, Hearings on 
H . R .  3818, 89th Congres s ,  1st Ses s . ,  1965. 
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the b i l l  was 25-3 . On February 2nd, one day after the approval , Lhe eleven 
Republi can members of the commi tee i s sued a formal s tatement of opposi ti on 
to the removal of the " enti re" gold cover .23 
The House Rules Commi ttee treated H.R. 3818 favorably by g ranting i t  
the rules most b i  1 1 s  recei ve Ivhen they are expected to pass Congres s .  The 
bi 11 I;as referred to the House as a Commi Uee of the \\Ih01 e .  The Rules  
COW.1lli ttee recoTP.1llended that the measure pass and al lot ed four hours for de-
bate , " equally divi ded and controlled by the chairman and ranking minori ty 
member of the Commi tee on Banking and Currency. "  Opportunity for amendment 
';ould b e  under the f i ve minute rule .  Representat i ve Claud; Pepper, a former 
Banking and Currency Commi ttee member of both the House and Senate gui ded 
the b i ll through safely. 2L 
On february 9th the House passed H.R.  3818, 300-82 , on a roll call 
vote. There were two hours of debate and no amendments were offered. 
The s t ory of the 1 965 gold reserve law i n  the Senate i s  s i mi lar . 
Both Hubert Humphrey, the pre s i ding officer of the Senate ,  and A. \,i l l i s  
Robertson, Chai rman o f  the Banking and Currency Commi ttee received letters 
from Secretary Di llon on January 2 8 ,  1965. Robertson introduced the 
Admini stration ' s b i l l  on the same day i n  the Senate. \'J i thout obj ecti on i t  
,laS referred t o  the Cornmi ttee on Banking and Currency. Senators Dou glas 
and j av i  ts also i ntroduced s imi la r  measures whi ch were r eferred to the sa'11e 
commi t tee :  
23Congressi ona1 Quarterly, vol . XXIII, No. 5 ,  p .  176. 
2!;rntervi ew wi th Art Roberts, Ass! stant to Claude Pepper ,  Democrat! c 
Representati ve from flori da to the U . S.  House of Representati ves, December 
2 1 ,  1 966. 
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Hearings Here held by the Senate Banfdng and Currency Commi ttee 
February 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th and 10th. The cOlllllli t  tee heard n ineteen 11i tnesses 
Hho represented a Id de cross section of AmeLi can i nterest and fee l i ng . In 
general , the same di scus s i on that the House cOlllllli ttee had gone through l;a5 
repeated. Secretary Di l lon and Chai rman Harti n ,  the star H i  tne sses, repeated 
essential ly the same testimony . 
A l though the role of advi sory groups has been menti oned before i n  ){eep-
ing track of such i tems as gol d  and the balance of payments,  the role of 
i nteres t  groups has not been di scussed. Both the Ameri can Bankers Associ a-
t i on and the Commi ttee for Economi c Deve lopment played si gnifi cant parts i n  
the passage of the gold reserve 1aH. 
The COlllllli ttee for Economi c Development i s  a powerful organi zation 
Hhose vi eHs are l i stened to by government . Rather than an i nterest group, 
the Commi ttee appears more as a forum Hhere l eaders of J�eri cal s indus try 
get together to di scuss problems facing the nati on. As early as 1 961 the 
COlllllli ssi on on I-Ioney and Credit ,  a group sponsored by C . E .D . ,  i ssued a b ook 
i n  which the repeal of al l reserve requi rements was advocated. I n  the Senate 
hearing, C . E .D .  Hi tnesses stated thi s  pos i t i on .  W i thin C . E . D .  membership 
are corporat i on executi ves representi ng every concel vable i ndustri al i nter-
est.  Si nce the power structure wi thin C . E . D .  is democrati c ,  the proper 
conclus i on i s  that C . B . D .  and i t s  fee ling on the gold reserve accurat ely 
reflected the v i e" s  of the informed financial c ommuni ty throughout the 
nat! on. 25 
Charles E .  \,alke 1', the executi ve vi ce-presi dent of the American 
Bankers Associati on, testified for the Senate COlllllli ttee on Banldng and 
2 5Interview w i th Paul S .  Anderson, v i s i t i ng staff economi s t ,  Commi ttee 
for Economi c Development , December 2 1 ,  1966. 
Currency. Walker felt that the repeal of the reserves on deposi t s  Has 
the best approach, not touching the other requi rement . Whi le bi g banks 
wi thin the ABA power structure l i ke Chase �lanhattan and Bank of Amer i ca 
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defini tely favored repeal of al l reserve requi rements, many of the li ttle 
banks and many banks Hi thout extensi va forei gn cont acts felt that all 
requir ements shou ld not be throHn out the w indo'l at once.  Thus, �]alker, 
who repre sented mos t of the nati on ' s  banks,  upheld the Admini strat i on ' s  
proposal as adequate for the present. He claimed tha t the exi sting re-
serve requirement " threatened econo:nic advances i n  the dome sti c economy 
and mi ght undermine confi dence i n  the dol lar abroad. ,, 26 These t uo reasons 
uere the same r eason s many o ther s had c ited for changing the la.l,27 
Thus i t  "as that on February 10th the bi 11 ,JaS marked up by the 
commi ttee in the exact form i t  had been presented. Houever, unlike i n ' the 
House ,  the Senate commit tee ,las spli t three uays concerning the bi 1 1 '  s 
provi s i ons, and mark-up Has not unanimous . 
The majori ty of the commi ttee backed the Admini strati on ' s  vi eHs. 
D i  scussion Hi thi n  thi s group centered around the changing role of gold. 
Three hi stori cal functi ons of gold Here noted, the fir st tuo of whi ch were 
considered outmoded. A r eserve requirement to assure the redeemabi lity of 
money and to serve as a l imi t to domestic cred i t  and monetary expansion 
represents tuo outmoded functi ons of gold. But gold sti l l  must serve as 
26U •S•  Congress , Senat e ,  Commi ttee on Banking and Currency, Hearings 
on S. 797, 8 9th Congress,  1st Sess. , 1 965 . 
27Intervieu u i th Joseph E. Jones, Pub l i c  Relations, Ameri can Brokers 
Assoc i ati on, Dec . 2 1 ,  1966. 
28Congressi onal Quarterly, vol .  XXII I ,  No. 8 ,  p .  267 . 
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a reservo i r  to meet the defi c i ts in i nternati onal payment s .  Thi s  Has the 
essence of the majo!'i to' opinion on the comml ttee . 
Senators Douglas, Proxmire, and Mondale compri sed one minori to' vi ew-
point. Thesz Senators ,lere more progressi ve than the Admini strat i on asked 
them to be. They accepted  the l essening role of go ld forthri ghtly and 
fel t that all reserve requirements should be don e away w i th .  I n  a ddi t i on,  
thi s g r oup of three Senators expressed worry t hat freeing only $4.9 b i l l i on 
of gold wou ld not meet future needs. 
The othe r minority viewpoint was expressed by Senators Bennet, Tmler, 
and Thurmond. Thi s group represent.s the conservat! ve bi  as of the commi ttee. 
Cri t i c i zing the Admi ni strati on at l ength for fai ling to  solve the balance 
of payments problem, these Republi cans refused to go a long 'lith the 
Democra t s  Hho Here i n  offi ce.  
On February 10, 1 965 the Senate Commi t tee on Banking and Currency 
reported favorably on S .  797 and recommended that i t  pass the Senate Hi th­
out amendment.2 9  
The Senate di d pass the bi l l  as ori gi n al ly submi tted by the Treasury 
Depar tment, but not Hithout c onsi derable debate and the offering of three 
8Jllendmen ts from the floor. The debate was concerned Hi th que sti ons 'lhi ch 
had already been scrutinized in commi ttee . Also, the e lement of decrying 
Has vocal and long-Hinded in cri ti c izing the poli c i es of the Admini strati ons, 
Hho, according to thi s vieH, had brought upon themselves the current diff i -
culti es . 
On February 4, 1 965 DeGaulle  i ssued a pub l i c  stat ement emphasi z ing 
the i mportance of gold to the Horid. He cal led for a return to the gold 
2% . S .  Congress, Senate, Commi Uee on Banking and Currency, Hearings 
on S.  797 , 89th Congress, 1s t Sess. , 1 965 . 
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s tandard .  The United States Treasury rep l i ed at length stat ing that the 
" return to the gold standard HOJ ld be a retreat to a sys tem Hhi ch had prolled 
incapable of financin g  the huge increase i n  Hodd trade that has marked the 
20th century.1 I30 
On February 1 7th Senator Peter H .  Domini ck ,  a Republican from Colorado, 
introduced an amendment to lOwer both reserlle reqUirements to 20% for tHO 
years and to estab l i sh a Joint Congressional commi ttee to investigate the 
Uni ted States defi c i t .  Pointing out ha4 thi s  que sti on had been di scussed i n  
commi ttee , Senator R obertson helped defeat the amendment by shotiing that 
both Under-Secretary Roosa of the Treasury and Chai rman Nartin o f  the Fed 
tiere opposed to i t . If top off i c i al s  of both the Treasury and the Fed agree 
on an i ssue, thei r  combined potier and presti ge i s  enou gh to influence 
Congress.  The Domini ck amendment l os t  16-48. 
On February 18th Senator Frank J .  Laushe , a Democrat from Ohi o ,  also 
lost the vote on h i s  amendment 22-58 .  Laushe re commended holding on to the 
present 1aH, but a1 loHing reserlles to f luctuate during " except i onal circum­
stances or a na ti  onal emer gency . "  
Senator Karl E. Mundt. a Republ i can from South Dakota, also introduced 
an amendment tihi ch lost overwhelmingly on a lIoi ce 1I0te . I'lundt, Horking 
purely for the ihterests of hi s cansti tuents and theri n  h i  s min poli ti cal 
future ,  requested the government to prollide subs i di e s  for domest i c  gold 
producers. Thi s i dea did not halle much appeal to anyone except the gold 
producers Hho may halle been s i tt ing in the gal ler i es .31 
On February 18 , 1 965 the Senate passed the 1 965 gold reserlle bi l l  
74-7 on a roll-ca l l  vot e .  The enrol led b i l l  \-JaS noti property of the Bureau 
30Congressi ona1 Quarterly, 1101 .  XXII I ,  No . 8,  p .  267 . 
3 1Ibi d .  
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of the Budget . 32 
Before the Presi  dent signs a b i l l  into law, the Bllreau o f  the Budget 
c lear s  i t .  Thi s procedure takes place regardless of whether the b i 1 l  has 
been cleared on its way i nto Congress ,  i .e "  r egardless of vlhi ch branch of 
the government ini t i a led the l eg i s1aticn. A l l  the depar tments previously 
discussed in Chapter I I I  once agai n approved the b i l l .  On March 3 ,  1965 
the Pre s i dent S i gned the bi l l  into law. H.R.  3818 and S. 797, Congres s i onal 
copies  of the ori ginal Treasury draft for a change i n  exi s ting law, became 
pllb l i c  law 8 9-3 . 
32U .S. Congressi onal Record, 89th Congress, 1st  Sess. , 1 965, vol . IS. 
Chapter V 
CONCWSION 
This study has d i scussed pol i t ics and economi cs relating to the 
1965 gold reserve law. I n  retrospect, the law seems to have fulfilled the 
i mmedi ate needs of the time. I t is f i tting to ask i f  the needs of the 
future were also provided f or .  
As stated i n  the first chapter, the long-run t rend i s  away from 
us ing gold i n  monetary sys tems . Only three nations in the enti re world 
nOH back the i r  monetary sys tems with gold reserves . None of these countri es 
are of major financial i mport ance.  As the world's money supply grows and as 
trade becomes greater, the importance of gold will  diminish. No nati on wi ll 
have a reserve requirement. Gold wi 11  be us ed exclus i  vely for producti ve 
purpos es ,  i ndustry and the arts , instead of being s tored underground and 
occasiona� shipped from onp. place to another . 
More i mportant than the long-run uses of g ol d  is i ts short-run future .  
The quest ions explored i n  this study all relate to the current defici t i n  
the Uni ted States bal ance of payments .  �)hat i s  the Administrati on doing 
today and what has i t  done s ince the 1965 gold reserve laH to solve the 
problem? 
On February 10, 1 965 Pres i dent Johnson gave the th i rd of his annual 
economi c messages to Congress . Johnson talked at length concernin g the 
background of suggested proposals to improve the United States balance of 
payments pos i t i on .  
Us ing the new gold reserve law t o  adva ntage, Johnson pointed out 
that the government was well-informed concerning all facets of the problem. 
The government Has acting i n  a number of \;ays to i mprove the s i tuat i on. 
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Four f lows are involved in the b alance of P"0'ments whi ch the govern­
ment has tinkered w i th or threatens to do s o .  The export- i mport net bal­
ance, U .S .  mi l i tary and economi c aid, i nves tment capi tal flows, and tourism 
present four areas in which the government mi ght act. To discuss what the 
government has done and Hhat i t  has not done wou 1d requi re a book i n  i ts elf.  
It is suffi ci ent to s tate that the government, through a number of depart­
ments and offi ce operat i ons ,  does have i ts eye on the s ituat i on and to 
menti on a feH of the government's a ctivi ties. 
In 1965, the Admi nistrat i on, mos tly through the Department of 
Commerce, inaugurated a new relat i onship between bus iness and government. 
The two i ns t i tutions wou ld work together voluntar i ly to ach i e ve a common 
goal of less ening the outflow of doll ars abroad. The program has been 
qui te successful i n  i ts speci fic  objective. This newly i n i t i ated relat i on­
ship could bring "li th i t a whole hos t  of changes in tradi ti onal roles of 
government and i ndus try. The present concern of industry for the "lar on 
poverty is perhaps an i ndicat i on of what is to come i n  the future. 
Many neH advisory groups both wi thin and outs ide of government 
have been establ ished s i nce 1965 to deal with the balance of payments 
problem. A lso, existing commi ttees have taken an i ncreased interest in 
promoting pol i ci es whi ch m i ght l ead to an equi l i brium o f  payments . 
Exempl ary of the groups formed is the Di l lon Commi t tee.  This 
commi ttee meets regularly every three Heeks and sometimes more often. I t  
provi des a forum for dis cussi on concerninp almost any economi c matters 
which are the respons i bi l i ty of the Treasury Depar tment. As explained 
previ ously, the balance of payments is primari ly a Treasury responsibi l i ty .  
Members o f  the D i l l on Commi ttee are for the most part either l eaders 
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of Ameri can indus try or former Secretar i e s  of the Treasury. Thus, the men 
,lho \,ere i ns trumental i n  insti gat in g  the movement wi thi n  the Treasury for 
the 1965 gold reserve law are s t i l l  i nfluenti al . If they are not con tent 
wi th the results of the i r  labor, they have the necessary means availabl e  to 
them to amel i or ate the s i tu a t ion . 
I t  appears that th e United States Hi l l  have a balan c e  o f  payment s 
problem for a nlli�er of years to c ome . R i ght now, the most i mporta�t factor 
causing thi s  i s  the Vi etNam liar. A l s o ,  the hi stori cal favorable balan c e  of 
trade which has been enjoyed since ,/orld v/ar II i s  fading. Due t o  conf i dence 
of forei gn central banks and powerful monetary aut hori ti es of vari ous govern­
ments, the present amount of free gold i s  suf f i c i en t  to mee t all concei vable 
needs for a fe,l years . Thi s i s  s o  e ven i f  the defi c i t  cont i nu e s .  
The United States i s  currently the wor l d ' s  largest trader. The U . S .  
i s  also the world ' s  lar gest banker . The roles i n termix and both o f  these 
roles H i l l  be thr eatened in the future . The d i ff i cul t que st ion i s--what 
wi 11 happen if the \,orld i s  no l onger con tent to use dollar s as the prime 
foundat i on of the world monetary system? If g o l d  i s  demanded in large 
quant i t i e s ,  the Uni ted States w i l l  supply i t .  Thi s  fundamental factor i s  
certai n .  From the Pre si dent on down to almost all informed c i t i zens, the 
p ol i cy o f  maintaini ng the commi tment to sell gold freely at $35 a troy 
ounce i s  firm. I f  occasi on deman ded i t ,  the remaining gold r eserve require­
ment ,lQuld be repealed in order to free gold for sh ipment abroad. 
The 1 965 gold reserve law passed Congress with the support of the 
conservative coal i ti on of Democrat s and Republi can s .  Any further demand 
for removal of the reserve requirement mi ght pr ecipi tate an extended 
debat e .  Becau s e  of psycholo g i cal factors previously di s cussed i n  th i s  
paper, world confi dence i n  the dollar cou Id b e  drasticElly shaken. 
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The more time that passes before the Administrat i on next asks Congress 
to change the r eserve ratio,  the better i t  w i l l  be for the s tab i l i ty of the 
dollar . A ls o ,  i n  an atmosphere of cris is , Iforry seems to perpetuate i tself 
i n  monetary markets in an exponential manner . Thus, i t  lieu ld be smart for 
the Administrat i on to keep ahead of i ts needs . The next t i me around, i t  
will  not b e  as easy t o  tel l reluctant Congressman--reduce the requi rement 
so  that ,Ie have t ime to solve the problem. Yet the need w i l l  probably be 
more acute , lVi thin thi s context, the dollar and thereby Ameri can leader­
ship could be i rreparably damaged. For thes e r easons , not for any reason 
of economi c theory , this wri ter hopes that the present reserve requirement 
wi ll be suff i c i ent for a number of years . 
APPENDIX 
Many governmental bod i es are di rectly or i ndi rectly charged wi th 
responsi b i l i ty for the United states balance of payments .  Many advi sory 
groups, both w i th i n  and outs i de of government, also concern themselves with 
the balance of payments . A par ti a1 1i  st of those i nsti tutions should be 
helpful to i ndicate the numerous forums in whi ch p roblems relating to gold 
and the U.S.  monetary system are explored. 
INDUSTRY 
Ameri can Bankers Associ ation 
Ameri can Farm Bureau Federation · 
Ameri can Ins ti tute of Banki ng 
Commi ttee for Ec cnomi c Development 
Commi t tee f or Sound Economi cs 
Internati onal Advi sory Commi ttee of the 
Chase l�anhattan Bank 
Uni ted States Counci l  of the Internat ional 
Chamber of Commerce 
Cabi net Commi ttee on the Balance of Payment s 
Dr l Ion Commi i!:ee 
Group of Ten (nlF') 
Nati onal Export Expansion Counci l  (Commerce 
D epartment) 
Organi zation for Economi c Co-operati on and Development 
GOVERNIiJENT -INDUSTRY 
Business Leadership Advi sory Counci l  
Commi ssi on on Money and Credi t 
Commi ttee on Member Bank Reserves of the 
Federal Reserve System 
Industry Advi sory Bus i ness Committee on the 
Balance of Payment s 
National Advi sory Counci 1 
ACADEI�C-GOVERNliJENT 
Regular �leeting of Professors at the Federal Reserve 
Bui ldi ng in Washington , D .C .  
ACADEl''IT C 
Economi cs Club of �ew York 
Economi st ' s  National Commi s s i on on Monetary Pol i cy 
RESEARCH I tJSTITIJTI oms 
Ameri can Economics Associ ati on 
Brooki ngs Ins t i tut i on 
Ins ti tute f or Monetary Research 
National Bureau of Economi c Research 
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U . S.  Federal Reserve Bank of NeH York, Dorothy Chri stelOlv, Economi st, 
November 23 , 1966, 
U . S .  House of Representati ves, Harold Col l i er ,  Republi can Repre sentative 
from I l l inOis,  October 3, 1966 . 
-------------, Jake LeHi s ,  Assi stant to  Vlri ght Patman, Democrati c 
Representati ve from Texas, October 3,  1 966. 
-------------, Art Roberts, Legi slati ve Assis tant to Claude Pepper, 
Democrat i c  Representati ve from Flori da, December 21 , 1966, 
U.S.  Senate, Natt Hal e ,  Assistant to Senator A. irIi l 1 i s  Robertson, Democrat 
from Virginia, November 18,  1966. 
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U .S.  Department of Commerce,  JOPJ' T .  Connor, Secretary of the Department , 
November 30, 1 966, 
U,S, Department of Treasury, Roy T. Engler t, Deputy General Counse l ,  
November 1 8 ,  1966. 
-------------, Leland HOHard, Dire ctor, Off i ce of Dome s t i c  Gold and Si 1 ver 
Operat ions, October 19, 1 966. 
-------------, T.  Page Nel s on, Director , Office  of Internati onal Gold and 
ForeLgn Exchange Operat i ons, .November 9, 1 966 . 
-------------, Jerry H. N i esenson, D i vi s i on of Internat i onal Affai rs ,  
Nov"mhei' S ,  1966. 
-------------, Ruth Pi ckne l l ,  Office of the General Counsel,  October 19, 1 966. 
-------------, Joseph L. Spi lman, Deputy Assi s tant to Secretary of the 
Treasury (Congressi onal l iai son) , October 2 7 ,  1 966. 
-------------, Frederi Ck L. Springborn, Staff member, Offi ce of International 
Poli cy and Co-ordinat i on, December 2 ,  1 966. 
